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Abstract 
 
The theoretical literature gives conflicting predictions on how bank competition should affect 
financial stability, and dozens of researchers have attempted to evaluate the relationship 
empirically. We collect 598 estimates of the competition-stability nexus reported in 31 studies 
and analyze the literature using meta-analysis methods. We control for 35 aspects of study 
design and employ Bayesian model averaging to tackle the resulting model uncertainty. Our 
findings suggest that the definition of financial stability and bank competition used by 
researchers influences their results in a systematic way. The choice of data, estimation 
methodology, and control variables also affects the reported coefficient. We find evidence for 
moderate publication bias. Taken together, the estimates reported in the literature suggest little 
interplay between competition and stability, especially in developing and transition countries, 
even when corrected for publication bias and potential misspecifications. 
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1 Introduction  
The theory does not provide clear guidance on the expected sign of the relationship between 
bank competition and financial stability. On the one hand, the competition-fragility hypothesis 
(represented, for example, by Keeley, 1990) argues that competition hampers stability. Strong 
competition in the banking sector forces banks to take on excessive risks in the search for yield, 
which leads to overall fragility of the financial system. On the other hand, under the 
competition-stability hypothesis (for instance, Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005), increased 
competition makes the financial system more resilient. A competitive banking sector results in 
lower lending rates, which support firms’ profitability, leading to lower credit risk for banks. 
Moreover, in uncompetitive environments banks are more likely to rely on their too-big-to-fail 
position and engage in moral hazard (Mishkin, 1999). Since the early 2000s, dozens of 
researchers have reported estimates of the competition-stability nexus, but their results vary. As 
Figure 1 shows, the dispersion of the results increases as time passes, complicating our 
inference from the literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the literature lacks patterns visible at first sight, narrative surveys are useful in discussing 
the reasons for the heterogeneity observed in the results, but they cannot provide policy makers 
and other researchers with clear guidelines concerning the relationship in question. Our aim in 
this paper is to collect all available estimates of the relation between bank competition and 
financial stability, and examine them using up-to-date meta-analysis methods. Meta-analysis is 
Figure 1: The reported estimates of the competition-stability nexus diverge 
Notes: The figure depicts the median partial correlation coefficients 
corresponding to the effects of banking competition on financial stability 
reported in individual studies. The horizontal axis measures the year when 
the first drafts of the studies appeared in Google Scholar. The line shows the 
linear fit (the slight upward trend is not statistically significant). 
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most commonly applied in medical research to synthesize the results of clinical trials, and the 
use of this method dates back at least to Pearson (1904). Meta-analysis later spread to the social 
sciences, including economics and finance, and examples of early applications are summarized 
by Stanley (2001). Recent applications of meta-analysis include Chetty et al. (2011), who explore 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply, Doucouliagos et al. (2012), who 
investigate the link between chief executives’ pay and corporate performance, and Babecky and 
Havranek (2014), who evaluate the impact of structural reforms on economic growth.  
We collect 598 estimates of the competition-stability nexus from 31 studies published between 
2003 and 2014, and present, to our knowledge, the first meta-analysis on the topic. We do not 
find evidence for any robust relationship between bank competition and financial stability: 
either the positive and negative effects of competition offset each other, or current data and 
methods do not allow researchers to identify the relationship. This conclusion holds even when 
we account for publication selection bias and potential misspecifications in the literature. 
Publication bias results from selective reporting of different empirical results. As Stanley (2001) 
notes, the bias can stem from a preference for estimates that are either statistically significant or 
consistent with a mainstream theory. The selection can occur at any stage of the publication 
process: authors may think that unintuitive results may be difficult to publish, so they put more 
weight on estimates that are easier to explain. Similarly, they might prefer statistically significant 
results, because in many cases insignificant estimates appear hard to sell. Journal editors and 
referees may display similar preferences. A recent survey of studies on publication selection 
bias in economics (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2013) suggests that the problem is widespread 
and that unpublished manuscripts often show such bias as well. In our case there are opposing 
theories concerning the effect of competition on stability, so both positive and negative 
estimates are publishable. Indeed, our results suggest that publication bias in the literature is not 
strong, but some authors still tend to preferentially report negative estimates (in line with the 
competition-fragility hypothesis), which biases the mean reported estimate downward.  
The studies estimating the effect of bank competition on financial stability differ greatly in terms 
of the data and methodology used. We account for 35 aspects of studies and estimates, 
including the length of the sample, regional coverage, the definitions of key variables, the 
inclusion of controls, the estimation methodology, and publication characteristics (such as the 
number of citations of the study and the impact factor of the journal). We explore how these 
aspects affect the reported estimates, and use Bayesian model averaging (BMA; Raftery et al., 
1997) to address model uncertainty. BMA is especially useful in meta-analysis, because for 
many study aspects there is no theory telling us how they should influence the results. Our 
findings indicate that researchers’ choices concerning the data used, the definitions of key 
variables, and the estimation methodology affect the reported estimates systematically. We also 
find that highly cited studies published in good journals tend to report larger estimates of the 
competition-stability nexus. Finally, using all the estimates we construct a synthetic study, for 
which we select the methodology and publication aspects that we prefer (such as control for 
endogeneity and the maximum number of citations). The resulting estimate of the competition-
stability nexus is very small.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the related literature on the topic 
and explains how the effect of bank competition on financial stability is estimated. Section 3 
explains how we collect the estimates and re-compute them to a common metric (partial 
correlation coefficients). Section 4 tests for the presence of publication bias. Section 5 describes 
the sources of heterogeneity in the literature and provides estimates of the competition-stability 
nexus conditional on our definition of best practice. In Section 6 we perform robustness checks 
using alternative priors for BMA and a more homogeneous subsample of estimates. Section 7 
concludes. Appendix A presents diagnostics of the BMA exercise, and Appendix B lists the 
studies included in the meta-analysis. 
 
2 Estimating the Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability  
The impact of bank competition on financial stability remains a controversial issue in the 
theoretical literature. Two opposing theories – the competition-stability hypothesis and the 
competition-fragility hypothesis – can be used to justify the conflicting results often found in 
empirical studies.  
The competition-fragility hypothesis asserts that more competition among banks leads to 
instability of the financial system. Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990) model theoretically the 
“charter value” proposition, where banks choose the risk level of their asset portfolios. In the 
setting of limited liability, bank owners, who are often given incentives to shift risks to 
depositors, tend to engage only in the upside part of the risk-taking process. In more 
competitive systems, this behavior places substantial emphasis on profits: banks have higher 
incentives to take on excessive risks, which leads to higher instability of the system in general. In 
addition, in competitive systems the incentives of banks to properly screen borrowers are 
reduced, which again contributes to system fragility (Allen and Gale, 2000; Allen and Gale, 
2004; Boot and Thakor, 1993). Conversely, when entry barriers are in place and competition in 
the sector is limited, banks have better profit opportunities and larger capital cushions and, 
therefore, are not prone to taking aggressive risks. In this framework highly concentrated 
banking systems contribute to overall financial stability (Boot and Greenbaum, 1993; Hellman, 
Murdoch, and Stiglitz, 2000; Matutes and Vives, 2000). 
The competition-stability hypothesis, on the other hand, proposes that more competitive 
banking systems imply less fragility of the financial system. Specifically, Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005) show that lower client rates facilitate lending as they reduce entrepreneurs’ cost of 
borrowing. Lower costs of borrowing raise the chance of investment success, which, in turn, 
lowers banks’ credit portfolio risk and leads to increased stability within the sector. Some 
theoretical studies reveal that banks in uncompetitive systems are more likely to originate risky 
loans, which pave the way to systemic vulnerabilities (Caminal and Matutes, 2002). Similarly, 
Mishkin (1999) stresses that, in concentrated systems, regulators are prone to implement too-
big-to-fail policies that encourage risk-taking behavior by banks. 
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Overall, it appears that empirical studies conducted for individual countries do not find 
conclusive evidence for either the stability-enhancing or the stability-deteriorating view of 
competition (Fungacova and Weill, 2009; Fernandez and Garza-Garciab, 2012; Liu and 
Wilson, 2013). Some of the cross-country literature shows that more competitive banking 
systems are less likely to experience a systemic banking crisis (Beck et al., 2006a; Schaeck et al., 
2009). In contrast, other studies (Yeyati and Micco, 2007; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; Boyd 
et al., 2006) reveal that in more competitive systems bank failures tend to be more frequent. 
Further research also provides evidence that in more concentrated systems banks have higher 
capital ratios, which offsets the possibly stronger risk-taking behavior on their part (Berger et al., 
2009; Schaeck and Cihak, 2012).  
In this meta-analysis we focus on variants of the following model used in the literature to 
examine the effect of bank competition on stability: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘=1 ,        (1) 
 
where i is a bank index and t a time index and X is a set of control variables, both bank-specific 
and country-specific. Measures of stability and competition tend to vary across individual 
studies, as we will discuss later in this section (the various estimation methods used by 
researchers will be discussed in Section 5). We are interested in the coefficient 𝛽𝛽. 
Bank stability is often measured in an indirect way, that is, by considering individual or systemic 
banking distress, effectively the negative of stability. In this spirit, the non-performing loan 
(NPL) ratio is often used as a fragility indicator. Nevertheless, the NPL ratio only covers credit 
risk and cannot be directly linked to the likelihood of bank failure (Beck, 2008). Another 
measure of individual bank distress extensively used in the literature is the Z-score (e.g. Boyd 
and Runkle, 1993; Lepetit et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Cihak and Hesse, 2010). This 
measure indicates how many standard deviations in return on assets a bank is away from 
insolvency and, by extension, from the likelihood of failure. The Z-score is calculated as 
follows:  
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,                                                       
where ROA is the rate of return on assets, E/TA is the ratio of equity to total assets, and 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is 
the standard deviation of the return on assets. Bank profitability, measured by ROA and ROE, 
profit volatility, approximated by ROA and ROE volatility, and bank capitalization, expressed 
by the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) or the ratio of equity to total bank assets, are additional 
measures of individual bank distress frequently used in the literature. Moreover, some studies 
(e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006a,b) model fragility in the banking sector by 
means of systemic banking crisis dummies. Other studies (such as Fungacova and Weill, 2009) 
apply individual bank failure dummies or measures of a bank’s distance-to-default to proxy 
financial stability. 
(2) 
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Concerning the proxies for competition, the Lerner index is one of the indicators frequently 
employed in the literature. This index quantifies the price power capacity of a bank by 
expressing the difference between price and marginal cost as a percentage of the price:  
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,  
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the price of total assets, expressed in practice by total revenues to total bank 
assets, and 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the marginal cost of total assets for bank i. The index thus takes values 
between 0 and 1, with the values of 0 and 1 reached only in the case of perfect competition and 
under pure monopoly, respectively. Alternatively, the degree of competition in the banking 
sector can be measured by the so-called H-statistic, introduced by Panzar and Rosse (1987). 
The H-statistic measures competition by summing the elasticities of a bank’s revenue with 
respect to its input prices. Another competition measure, the Boone (2008) indicator, applied 
by Schaeck and Cihak (2012), for example, expresses the effect of competition on the 
performance of efficient banks and offers an organization-based explanation for how 
competition can improve stability.  
In addition, concentration ratios were originally used as bank competition proxies: for instance, 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the C3 concentration ratio, which indicates the share of 
the three largest banks’ assets in the total assets of the country’s banking system. Nevertheless, 
some studies (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004) have shown that bank concentration is not an 
adequate indicator of the competitive nature of the system, as concentration and competition 
highlight different banking sector characteristics. In the spirit of better erring on the side of 
inclusion in meta-analysis (Stanley, 2001), we also collect estimates that measure competition by 
the inverse of concentration, and conduct a robustness check where we exclude these estimates.  
3 The Data Set of Competition-Stability Estimates 
 
The first step in any meta-analysis is to collect estimates from primary studies. We search for 
studies relevant to our meta-analysis using the Google Scholar and RePEc search engines and 
the following combinations of keywords: “competition” and “stability,” “competition” and 
“fragility,” “concentration” and “stability,” and “concentration” and “fragility.” We collect both 
published and unpublished studies, and try to include as many papers as possible. Since we 
need standard errors of the estimates to be able to use up-to-date meta-analysis methods, we 
have to omit studies that do not report statistics from which standard errors can be computed. 
In the end, we are left with 31 studies, which report 598 estimates. We also collect 35 variables 
reflecting the context in which researchers obtain their estimates. Our data collection strategy, as 
well as all other aspects of this meta-analysis, conform to the Meta-Analysis of Economics 
Research Reporting Guidelines (Stanley et al., 2013). 
Given the broad scope of the measures used in the literature to proxy for both bank 
competition and financial stability, it is imperative that we recompute the individual estimates to 
(3) 
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a common metric. Because some stability proxies measure financial fragility and some 
competition proxies investigate how uncompetitive the market is (for example, larger values of 
the Lerner index imply a less competitive nature of the system), we adjust the signs of the 
collected estimates so that they directly reflect the relationship between competition and 
stability. After this adjustment the collected estimates imply either that higher competition 
increases bank stability or that higher competition decreases bank stability, and they could be 
compared with each other if all studies used the same units of measurement.  
Due to the inconsistency in the use of measurement units of regression variables in the 
literature, we transform the reported estimates into partial correlation coefficients (PCCs). The 
PCC is a unitless measure of the strength and direction of the association between two variables, 
competition and stability in our case, while holding other variables constant (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012). The PCCs enable us to directly compare estimates reported in different 
studies. This technique is widely used in meta-analysis research nowadays; a related application 
can be found, for example, in Valickova et al. (2014).  
The partial correlation coefficient is calculated according to the following formula:  
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑖𝑖
�𝑖𝑖2+𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
, 
where t is the t-statistic of the reported coefficient and df denotes the number of degrees of 
freedom used for the estimation. The corresponding standard errors of the PCC are calculated 
as follows:  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = �(1−𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀2)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
. 
Moreover, if the primary study assumes a quadratic relationship between competition and 
stability and thus reports two coefficients associated with the measure of competition, the overall 
impact on stability needs to be linearized using the following formula: 
𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽1� + 𝛽𝛽2�?̅?𝑥           𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝛽𝛽) = �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�𝛽𝛽1��2 + 4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�𝛽𝛽2��2?̅?𝑥2, 
where 𝛽𝛽1� is the estimate of the competition coefficient for the linear term, 𝛽𝛽2� is the estimate of 
the competition coefficient for the quadratic term, ?̅?𝑥 is the sample mean of the competition 
measure in the study, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�𝛽𝛽1�� is the standard error of the reported coefficient for the linear 
term, and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�𝛽𝛽2�� is the standard error of the reported coefficient for the quadratic term. The 
covariance term is omitted from the 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝛽𝛽) formula due to the unavailability of the original data. 
The resulting coefficient of bank competition after linearization is subsequently transformed 
into the PCC in line with equations (4) and (5). 
Figure 2 depicts the within- and between-study dispersion in the partial correlation coefficients 
of the competition-stability estimates reported in the 31 studies that we examine in this meta-
analysis. It is apparent that the literature is highly heterogeneous, both between and within 
studies. Meta-analysis will help us to formally trace the sources of this heterogeneity. 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
7 
 
    
 Unweighted Weighted No. of estimates 
 Mean 95% Conf. Int. Mean 95% Conf. Int. 
All -0.001 -0.025 0.023 -0.012 -0.035 0.011 598 
Developed 0.020 -0.032 0.073 0.011 -0.030 0.052 201 
Developing 
and transition 0.001 -0.022 0.023 -0.019 -0.051 0.012 194    
 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for all the estimates and for two subsamples of the estimates 
that evaluate the effect for developed and developing countries. All the means reported in 
Table 1 are close to zero, indicating little interplay between competition and stability. The 
Figure 2: Variability in the estimated competition coefficients across individual studies 
Notes: The figure shows a box plot of the PCCs of the competition coefficient estimates (the PCCs of 
the β estimates from equation (1)) reported in individual studies. Full references for the studies 
included in the meta-analysis are available in Appendix B. 
 
Table 1: Estimates of the competition effect for different country groups 
Notes: The table presents the mean PCCs of the competition coefficient estimates (the PCCs of 
the β estimates from equation (1)) over all countries and for selected country groups. The 
confidence intervals around the mean are constructed using standard errors clustered at the study 
level. In the right-hand part of the table the estimates are weighted by the inverse of the number of 
estimates reported per study. 
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means of the competition coefficient estimates for developed countries are slightly larger than 
those for developing and transition countries. (The overall mean is slightly negative, while the 
means for both developing and developed countries are positive, which suggests that studies that 
mix these two groups tend to find smaller estimates of the effect.) No strong inference can be 
made, however, as none of the reported means is significant at the 5% level of significance. 
Moreover, all these values are negligible and would be classified as implying no effect according 
to the guidelines for the interpretation of partial correlation coefficients in economics 
(Doucouliagos, 2011). 
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the partial correlation coefficients of all the competition 
coefficient estimates. It appears that the PCCs are symmetrically distributed around zero with a 
mean of -0.0009, while the mean of the study-level medians is also close to zero and equals 
0.0099. We also report the mean of the PCCs of the estimates that are reported in studies 
published in peer-reviewed journals, as opposed to those reported in unpublished manuscripts. 
In total, 21 of the 31 studies in our sample were published in peer-reviewed journals, yielding 
376 estimates of the competition coefficient. The mean for published studies is 0.0116: it 
appears that journals tend to report slightly larger estimates of the competition coefficient 
compared to the grey literature.  
               
Figure 3: Studies published in journals report slightly larger estimates 
Notes: The figure shows the histogram of the PCCs of the competition 
coefficient estimates (the PCCs of the β estimates from equation (1)) reported in 
individual studies. The solid vertical line denotes the mean of all the PCCs. The 
dashed lines denote the mean of the median PCCs of the estimates from the 
studies and the mean of the PCCs of those estimates that are reported in studies 
published in peer-reviewed journals, respectively. 
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4 Testing for Publication Bias  
Publication selection bias arises when an estimate’s probability of being reported depends on its 
sign or statistical significance. Rosenthal (1979) refers to this phenomenon as the “file drawer 
problem,” implying that researchers may hide estimates that are either insignificant or have a 
counterintuitive sign in their file drawers, and seek instead to obtain new estimates that would 
be easier to publish. A number of studies, e.g., by DeLong and Lang (1992), Card and Krueger 
(1995), and Ashenfelter et al. (1999), identify publication selection bias in empirical economics. 
In addition, Doucouliagos and Stanley (2013) conduct a survey of meta-analyses and find that 
most fields of empirical economics suffer from publication bias. The bias tends to inflate the 
mean estimates reported by empirical studies. For example, Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
estimate that the adverse employment effect of minimum wage increases is seriously overstated 
in the published empirical literature. In this section, we test for potential publication bias in the 
literature evaluating the competition-stability nexus before we proceed with the analysis of 
heterogeneity in the next section.  
 
We start with visual tests for the presence of publication bias. The most commonly applied 
graphical test uses the so-called funnel plot (Egger et al., 1997), which depicts the magnitude of 
the estimated effect on the horizontal axis and precision (the inverse of the estimated standard 
error) on the vertical axis. The most precise estimates (located at the top of the funnel) should 
be close to the true underlying effect. With decreasing precision, the estimates get more 
dispersed; overall, they should form a symmetrical inverted funnel. If there is publication bias in 
the literature, the funnel is either asymmetrical due to the exclusion of estimates of a certain 
sign or size, or hollow due to the omission of insignificant estimates, or displays both these 
properties.  
Figure 4A shows the funnel plot for the PCCs of all the competition coefficient estimates 
reported in the studies, while Figure 4B depicts the funnel plot for the median values of the 
PCCs of the estimates reported in individual studies.  
         
Figure 4: Funnel plots do not suggest strong publication bias 
A) All estimates 
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We observe that both funnels are relatively symmetrical, and the most precise estimates are 
close to the mean reported PCC of the estimates. Moreover, the funnels are not hollow, and 
even estimates with very little precision (and large p-values) at the bottom of both plots are 
reported. Therefore, we can infer that these funnel plots do not point to the presence of 
publication bias in the competition-stability literature, as opposed to the findings in most other 
fields in economics and finance (for example, Havranek and Kokes, 2014).  
A more rigorous approach to testing for publication bias consists in funnel asymmetry tests. 
These tests explore the relationship between the collected coefficient estimates and their 
standard errors following the methodology suggested by Card and Krueger (1995). In the 
presence of publication selection, the reported estimates are correlated with their standard 
errors. For example, if negative estimates are omitted, a positive relationship appears between 
the reported coefficient estimates and their standard errors because of heteroskedasticity in the 
equation (Stanley, 2008). Similarly, researchers who prefer statistical significance need large 
estimates to offset large standard errors. Thus, we estimate the following equation:  
 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,                                                  
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the partial correlation coefficient of the competition coefficient estimate, 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) is the standard error of the partial correlation coefficient, 𝛽𝛽0 is the mean PCC 
corrected for the potential publication bias, 𝛽𝛽1 measures the extent of publication bias, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is 
B)   Median estimates from studies 
Notes: In the absence of publication bias the funnel should be 
symmetrical around the most precise estimates of the competition 
coefficient (the PCC of the β estimate from equation (1)). The dashed 
vertical lines denote the mean of the PCCs of all the estimates in 
Figure 4A and the mean of the study-level medians reported in 
Figure 4B.  
(7) 
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a disturbance term. Equation (7) is commonly called the funnel asymmetry test, as it follows 
from rotating the axes of the funnel plot and inverting the values on the new horizontal axis so 
that it now shows standard errors instead of precision.  
 
The results of the funnel asymmetry tests are presented in Table 2. The coefficient estimates in 
the upper part of the table result from fixed effects estimation with standard errors clustered at 
the level of individual studies and from instrumental variable estimation (where the number of 
observations is used as an instrument for the standard error). Fixed effects control for method 
or other quality characteristics specific to individual studies. We also report results for the 
subsample of estimates reported in published studies to see whether they show different levels 
of publication selection bias. The bottom half of the table presents results from regressions 
weighted by the inverse of the number of estimates reported per study in order to diminish the 
effect of studies reporting many estimates. In all specifications in Table 2, both coefficient 
estimates are significant at least at the 5% level. A moderate negative publication bias is present, 
and the estimated size of the competition-stability effect beyond publication bias appears to be 
close to zero (again, negligible according to the guidelines by Doucouliagos, 2011).  
 
 
Unweighted regressions Fixed Effects Fixed Effects_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
SE (publication bias) -1.671** -1.898** -1.614*** -2.291*** 
Constant (effect beyond bias) 0.044** 0.073** 0.043*** 0.086*** 
No. of estimates 598 376 598 376 
No. of studies 31 21 31 21 
Weighted regressions Fixed Effects Fixed Effects_Published 
SE (publication bias) -1.568*** -1.636*** 
Constant (effect beyond bias) 0.034*** 0.044*** 
No. of estimates 598 376 
No. of studies 31 21   
 
 
 
 
The magnitude of the publication bias is slightly larger in published studies than in unpublished 
manuscripts, but the difference is not statistically significant. We consider it remarkable that the 
fixed effects and instrumental variable specifications yield very similar results. In meta-analysis it 
is important to check for endogeneity of the standard error, because very often it can happen 
that the meta-analyst cannot collect all relevant information on the methodology used in the 
primary studies. If the meta-analyst omits an aspect of methodology that influences both the 
reported coefficients and their standard errors in the same direction, he or she will obtain 
Table 2: Funnel asymmetry tests show moderate publication bias 
Notes: The table presents the results of the regression specified in equation (6). The standard errors of the 
regression parameters are clustered at the study level. Published = we only include published studies. Fixed 
Effects = we use study dummies. Instrument = we use the logarithm of the number of observations in 
equation (1) as an instrument for the standard error and employ study fixed effects. The regressions in the 
bottom half of the table are estimated by weighted least squares, where the inverse of the number of estimates 
reported per study is taken as the weight. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level. 
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biased estimates of the magnitude of the publication bias. Our results suggest that in the case of 
the competition-stability nexus endogeneity is not an important issue.  
Equation (7), however, suffers from heteroskedasticity, because the explanatory variable directly 
captures the variance of the response variable. To achieve efficiency, many meta-analysis 
applications divide equation (7) by the corresponding standard error, i.e., they multiply the 
equation by the precision of the estimates. This specification places more emphasis on precise 
results. Dividing equation (7) by the corresponding SE of the PCC, we obtain the following 
equation:  
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽0(1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)⁄ ) + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝛽𝛽0 is the mean PCC of the coefficient estimate corrected for the potential publication 
bias, 𝛽𝛽1 measures the extent of publication bias, and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the corresponding t-statistic. Table 3 
below presents results from the heteroskedasticity-corrected equation (8). 
 
 
Weighted by precision Fixed Effects Fixed Effects_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond bias) 0.005 0.065 0.019** 0.053*** 
Constant (publication bias) -0.757 -4.000* -1.706** -3.344*** 
No. of estimates 598 376 598 376 
No. of studies 31 21 31 21 
Weighted by precision and 
no. of observations Fixed Effects Fixed Effects_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond bias) 0.013 0.056** 
Constant (publication bias) -1.539** -4.339** 
No. of estimates 598 376 
No. of studies 31 21     
We can observe from Table 3 that publication bias is not equally strong across all specifications, 
in contrast to Table 2. Moreover, the true underlying effect beyond publication bias is only 
significant when equation (8) is estimated by means of instrumental variables or by fixed effects 
for the subsample of published studies. Table 3 confirms that the competition-stability effect 
beyond publication bias is indeed close to zero, as no estimate surpasses the threshold defined 
by Doucouliagos (2011) to denote at least a weak effect. The story changes for publication bias, 
which now seems to be much stronger in published studies than in unpublished manuscripts, 
which would suggest that journal editors or referees prefer papers that show results consistent 
with the competition-fragility hypothesis. 
Table 3: Heteroskedasticity-corrected funnel asymmetry tests confirm the presence of publication bias 
Notes: The table presents the results of the regression specified in equation (7). The standard errors of the 
regression parameters are clustered at the study level. Published = we only include published studies. Fixed 
Effects = we use study dummies. Instrument = we use the logarithm of the number of observations in 
equation (1) as an instrument for the standard error and employ study fixed effects. The regressions in the 
bottom half of the table are additionally weighted by the inverse of the number of estimates reported per study. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
(8) 
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For evaluation of the extent of publication bias, Doucouliagos and Stanley (2013) provide 
guidelines for the value of the constant in the funnel asymmetry test specified by equation (8). 
They identify that the literature suffers from substantial selectivity if ?̂?𝛽1 from equation (8) is 
statistically significant and, at the same time, 1 ≤ �?̂?𝛽1� ≤ 2. Both conditions hold for the value of 
the constant estimated by fixed effects and weighted by the inverse of the number of 
observations, as well as for the constant in regressions estimated by the instrumental variable 
method. The values of the coefficient estimated in Table 3 for published studies are even larger 
than 2, which would suggest severe publication bias according to the guidelines by Doucouliagos 
and Stanley (2013). Nevertheless, we believe the overall evidence points to only moderate 
publication bias, because the corrected estimates of the competition-stability nexus are close to 
the simple mean of all the estimates uncorrected for publication bias. 
 
5 Why the Reported Coefficients Vary 
 
5.1 Variable Description and Methodology 
 
In this section we add the characteristics of the studies and estimates into equation (7) to 
explore what drives the heterogeneity in the literature. We do not weight the resulting equation 
by precision as is the case in equation (8): weighting by the estimates’ precision introduces 
artificial variation into variables either that are defined at the study level (for example, the 
impact factor of the study) or that tend to vary little within studies (for example, sample size). In 
contrast, we weight the regressions by the inverse of the number of estimates reported per study 
to give the same importance to each study in our data set. In the next section we also perform a 
robustness check for regressions not weighted by the number of estimates per study.  
Table 4 describes all the variables that we collect from the primary studies. For each variable 
the table also shows the mean, the standard deviation, and the mean weighted by the inverse of 
the number of estimates reported per study. For ease of exposition we divide the collected 
variables into eight groups.  
Variable Description Mean SD WM 
Data characteristics 
Competition 
coefficient 
The coefficient capturing the effect of bank competition on 
financial stability (recomputed to the partial correlation coeff.) -0.001 0.090 -0.012 
SEPCC The estimated standard error of the competition coefficient 0.027 0.022 0.029 
Samplesize The logarithm of the number of cross-sectional units used in the competition-stability regression 7.835 1.615 7.760 
T The logarithm of the number of time periods (years) 2.224 0.743 2.264 
sampleyear The mean year of the sample period on which the competition-stability regression is estimated (base: 1992,5) 8.889 4.328 9.340 
Countries examined 
developed equals 1 if the researcher only examines OECD countries 0.336 0.473 0.366 
developing and 
transition equals 1 if the researcher only examines non-OECD countries 0.324 0.469 0.376 
Table 4: Overview and summary statistics of the regression variables 
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Design of the analysis 
quadratic equals 1 if the square of the competition coefficient is included in the regression 0.119 0.324 0.217 
endogeneity equals 1 if the estimation method accounts for endogeneity 0.635 0.482 0.713 
macro equals 1 if the competition-stability regression is estimated using country-level data 0.256 0.437 0.133 
averaged 
equals 1 if the competition-stability regression uses variables in the 
form of country-level averages over banks 0.120 0.326 0.085 
Treatment of stability 
dummies equals 1 if stability is measured by a crisis dummy or a bank failure dummy 0.142 0.349 0.129 
NPL equals 1 if stability is measured by non-performing loans as a share of total loans 0.050 0.218 0.095 
Zscore equals 1 if stability is measured by the Z-score statistic 0.452 0.498 0.537 
profit_volat equals 1 if stability is measured by ROA volatility or ROE volatility 0.075 0.264 0.039 
profitability equals 1 if stability is measured by ROA or ROE 0.043 0.204 0.045 
capitalization equals 1 if stability is measured by the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) or the equity-total assets ratio 0.069 0.253 0.040 
DtoD equals 1 if stability is measured by Logistic R2 Merton’s distance-to-default or probability of bankruptcy 0.065 0.247 0.047 
Treatment of competition 
Hstatistic equals 1 if competition is measured by the H-statistic 0.090 0.287 0.098 
Boone equals 1 if competition is measured by the Boone indicator 0.075 0.264 0.108 
Concentration equals 1 if competition is measured by concentration measures C3 or C5 0.157 0.364 0.147 
Lerner equals 1 if competition is measured by the Lerner index 0.360 0.480 0.414 
HHI equals 1 if competition is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.266 0.442 0.197 
Estimation methods 
Logit equals 1 if the logit or probit model is used in the estimation of the competition-stability regression 0.172 0.378 0.161 
OLS equals 1 if OLS is used in the estimation 0.137 0.344 0.115 
FE equals 1 if fixed effects are used in the estimation 0.229 0.421 0.136 
RE equals 1 if random effects are used in the estimation 0.067 0.250 0.043 
GMM equals 1 if GMM is used in the estimation 0.182 0.386 0.309 
TSLS equals 1 if two-stage least squares are used in the estimation 0.149 0.356 0.110 
Control variables 
regulation equals 1 if regulatory/supervisory variables are included in the competition-stability regression 0.239 0.427 0.282 
ownership equals 1 if bank ownership is controlled for in the competition-stability regression 0.166 0.372 0.271 
global equals 1 if macroeconomic variables are included in the 
competition-stability regression 
0.794 0.405 0.764 
Publication characteristics 
citations 
The logarithm of the number of Google Scholar citations 
normalized by the difference between 2015 and the year the study 
first appeared in Google Scholar (collected in July 2014) 
2.045 1.222 1.790 
firstpub The year when the study first appeared in Google Scholar (base: 
2003) 
6.453 2.979 6.677 
IFrecursive The recursive impact factor of the outlet from RePEc (collected in July 2014) 0.243 0.210 0.205 
reviewed_journal equals 1 if the study is published in a peer-reviewed journal 0.629 0.484 0.677    
Notes: SD = standard deviation. WM = mean weighted by the inverse of the number of estimates reported per 
study. All variables except for citations and the impact factor are collected from studies estimating the competition 
coefficient from equation (1). The search for studies was terminated on July 1, 2014, and the list of studies included 
is available in Appendix B. Citations are collected from Google Scholar and the impact factor from RePEc. 
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Group 1 – Data characteristics: We control for the age of the data used in the primary studies 
by including the variable sampleyear, which represents the midpoint of the data period used by 
researchers. Moreover, we account for the number of cross-sectional units used to estimate the 
competition coefficient in equation (1) and for the number of time periods used in the 
estimation. The underlying reasoning is that, ceteris paribus, one would like to place more 
weight on studies using larger samples, and it is therefore important to check whether such 
studies yield systematically different results. 
Group 2 – Countries examined: As the estimates of the competition coefficient may have 
different size and signs for different countries or blocks of countries, we control for this 
potential source of heterogeneity by including dummies for developed (OECD member) 
countries and developing and transition (non-OECD) countries. In our sample, 34% of all the 
collected estimates are obtained using a sample of developed countries, while 32% of estimates 
are extracted from studies focusing on developing and transition countries. The remaining third 
of studies mix these two groups of countries in their estimations. 
Group 3 – Design of the analysis: We control for specific aspects of the studies in our sample, 
captured by the variables endogeneity, macro, quadratic, and averaged. The dummy variable 
endogeneity reflects whether individual studies account for potential endogeneity in their 
analysis, either via econometric methods or by using lagged values of variables in equation (1). 
The dummy variable macro assigns the value 1 to an estimate if the estimate is calculated using 
data constructed at the aggregate level, as opposed to studies using bank-level data. Next, the 
dummy variable averaged assigns the value 1 to an estimate if the regressors in equation (1) in 
the original study are constructed as country-level averages over banks, even though the data are 
technically bank-level. Finally, the dummy variable quadratic controls for the inclusion of the 
square of the competition measure in the regressions. In total, 12% of the estimates in our 
sample have to be linearized because researchers test for possible nonlinear relationships 
between bank competition and stability. 
Group 4 – Treatment of stability: We control for differences in the way stability is measured in 
individual studies. Due to the large diversity of the approaches to measuring financial stability in 
the literature, it is possible that a substantial portion of the variation in the competition 
coefficient estimates is due to a different definition of stability. We distinguish the seven most 
common approaches. Some researchers use dummy variables representing either the outbreak 
of a systemic banking crisis or a bank failure (e.g. Beck et al., 2006 a,b; Fungacova and Weill, 
2009). Popular methods for measuring individual bank stability include the ratio of non-
performing loans to total bank loans, the return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE) as 
measures of bank profitability, fluctuations in ROA or ROE as indicators of bank profit 
volatility, the Z-score, an aggregate measure of bank stability, measures of capitalization, the 
capital adequacy ratio or equity to assets ratio, and measures of distance to default. 
Group 5 – Treatment of competition: Similarly to the indicators of stability, there is large 
diversity in the approaches to quantifying competition within the banking sector. We control for 
the five most commonly used measures. For 36% of the estimates in our sample, competition is 
measured via the Lerner index. Other indicators include Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) H-statistic 
and Boone’s (2008) Boone index. Quite frequently, measures of market structure are applied 16 
 
to assess the intensity of competition in the sector, such as concentration ratios and Herfindahl-
Hirschman indices (HHI), which are used to compute 42% of the estimates in the sample (e.g., 
by Beck et al., 2006 a,b; Berger et al., 2009; Boyd et al., 2006; Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2009). 
We decide to include the estimates arising from the use of these market structure measures in 
our analysis despite the recent assertions in the literature that concentration is not a suitable 
proxy for a lack of competition (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Bikker, 2004). As a 
robustness check in Section 6, we estimate the impact of competition on stability after excluding 
these potentially misspecified estimates from our sample. 
Group 6 – Estimation methods: We control for six different estimation methods in our analysis: 
OLS, FE, RE, GMM, TSLS, and logit. We assume that different approaches to estimating 
equation (1) might affect the resulting estimates of the competition coefficient. The most 
frequently used estimation methods in our sample are fixed effects (23% of estimates), followed 
by GMM (18%) and logit (17%). In our data set the variable reflecting the use of logit is not 
identical to the variable that captures the use of dummy variables on the left-hand side, because 
some of the studies that employ dummy variables use linear estimation techniques. Moreover, 
other studies, e.g. Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2009), incorporate either random effects or GMM 
estimators into logit and probit models, which we in turn classify into the RE or GMM 
categories. 
Group 7 – Control variables: The most commonly used controls in the estimation of the 
competition-stability relationship in equation (1) are macroeconomic variables defined at the 
country level, regulatory and supervisory variables such as capital stringency, supervisory power, 
the investor protection index, economic and banking freedom, the share of market entry 
restrictions or governance (e.g. Cihak et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2006 a,b; Beck et al., 2013; 
Anginer et al., 2014; Agoraki et al., 2011), and ownership controls, i.e., foreign and state bank 
ownership (e.g. Bazzana and Yaldiz, 2010; Berger et al., 2009; De Nicolò and Loukoianova, 
2007). Macroeconomic variables are used as controls in 79% of regressions, while regulatory 
and supervisory controls are used in 24% of regressions and ownership variables in 17% of 
regressions.  
Group 8 – Publication characteristics: In order to evaluate whether studies published in peer-
reviewed journals report systematically different estimates in comparison to unpublished studies 
after we control for data and methodology, we include a corresponding dummy variable. 
Moreover, we control for study quality by including the number of citations and the recursive 
RePEc impact factor. Finally, for each study we add the year when it first appeared in Google 
Scholar to control for the potential time trend in the literature.  
 
We would like to run a regression with the PCC of the estimates of the competition coefficient 
as the dependent variable and all the variables introduced above as explanatory variables. 
Nevertheless, including all of the variables at the same time is infeasible as we would probably 
obtain many redundant regressors in the specification. With such a large number of explanatory 
variables, we initially do not know which ones should be excluded from the model. An ideal 
approach would be to run regressions with different subsets of independent variables to ensure 
that our results are robust: to this end, we employ Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to resolve 
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the model uncertainty problem, an issue that is inevitable in meta-regression analysis. BMA 
runs many regressions with different subsets of all the 235 possible combinations of explanatory 
variables (we have 35 regressors at our disposal). To make the estimation feasible, we employ 
the Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithm to go through the most promising of the potential 
models (we use the bms package for R developed by Feldkircher and Zeugner, 2009). BMA 
gives each model a weight, which can be thought of as an analogy of the adjusted R-squared, to 
capture the model’s fit. Finally, BMA reports weighted averages from the models for posterior 
mean values of regression parameters and posterior standard deviations, which capture the 
distribution of regression parameters across individual models. Moreover, a posterior inclusion 
probability (PIP) is reported for each variable to show the probability with which the variable is 
included in the true model. Raftery et al. (1997) and Eicher et al. (2011) provide further details 
on BMA in general. Detailed diagnostics of our BMA exercise can be found in Appendix A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Results 
 
Figure 5 shows the results of the BMA exercise. The columns in the figure denote the 
individual regression models, while their width indicates the models’ posterior probabilities. 
The variables are sorted by their PIP in descending order. If the sign of a variable’s regression 
coefficient is positive, it is denoted by blue color (darker in grayscale). Conversely, if the sign of 
Notes: The response variable is the PCC of the estimate of the competition coefficient (the PCC of the β 
estimate from equation (1)). All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the number of estimates reported 
per study. Columns denote individual models; the variables are sorted by posterior inclusion probability in 
descending order. Blue color (darker in grayscale) = the variable is included and the estimated sign is positive. 
Red color (lighter in grayscale) = the variable is included and the estimated sign is negative. No color = the 
variable is not included in the model. The horizontal axis measures the cumulative posterior model 
probabilities. Numerical results of the BMA estimation are reported in Table 5. A detailed description of all 
the variables is available in Table 4. 
Figure 5: Bayesian model averaging – model inclusion 
18 
 
a variable’s coefficient is negative, it is colored in red. Where a variable is excluded from a 
model, the corresponding cell is left blank. The horizontal axis measures the cumulative model 
probabilities: the models that are the most successful in explaining the heterogeneity in the 
estimates of the competition effect are on the left, and we can see that they include less than a 
half of all the variables. 
 
The numerical results of the BMA exercise are reported in Table 5. On the right-hand side of 
the table we also report the results of OLS estimation with standard errors clustered at the level 
of individual studies. From this “frequentist check” we exclude the variables that prove to be 
irrelevant for the explanation of the variability in the literature (that is, have PIP lower than 0.5). 
The OLS regression thus includes 15 variables identified by BMA to help explain the variation 
in the reported competition effects. Overall, OLS with clustered standard errors yields results 
consistent with BMA for variables with high inclusion probabilities. The signs of the variables’ 
regression parameters are the same and the size of their parameter estimates is similar as well. 
Therefore, we can conclude that our results are robust to error-clustering, as BMA by definition 
does not cluster standard errors in the estimation. Eicher et al. (2011) provide a framework for 
the identification of the strength of the variables’ effect in BMA. The effect of a variable is 
considered weak if the corresponding PIP is between 0.5 and 0.75, substantial if it is between 
0.75 and 0.95, strong if it is between 0.95 and 0.99, and decisive if it exceeds 0.99.  
  
Response variable: Bayesian model averaging Frequentist check (OLS) 
Competition effect Post. Mean Post. SD PIP Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P-value 
Data characteristics 
  
  
   SEPCC -1.7883 0.2046 1.0000 -1.1940 0.6511 0.067 
Samplesize -0.0367 0.0035 1.0000 -0.0240 0.0089 0.007 
T 0.0005 0.0039 0.0517 
   sampleyear 0.0000 0.0005 0.0456    
Countries examined 
  
  
   developed 0.2015 0.0219 1.0000 0.1761 0.0295 0.000 
developing and transition 0.1072 0.0169 1.0000 0.0985 0.0262 0.000 
Design of the analysis 
  
  
   quadratic -0.0533 0.0124 0.9971 -0.0441 0.0128 0.001 
endogeneity 0.0100 0.0212 0.2371 
   macro 0.0025 0.0124 0.0699 
   someAveraged -0.0004 0.0047 0.0397    
Treatment of stability 
  
  
   dummies 0.2115 0.0282 1.0000 0.1841 0.0194 0.000 
NPL 0.0020 0.0060 0.1323 
   Zscore -0.0005 0.0027 0.0630 
   profit_volat 0.0006 0.0051 0.0371 
   profitability -0.0003 0.0030 0.0354 
   capitalization 0.0001 0.0029 0.0271 
   DtoD -0.0013 0.0078 0.0504    
Treatment of competition 
  
  
   Hstatistic 0.1083 0.0217 1.0000 0.1140 0.0181 0.000 
Boone -0.0709 0.0313 0.8974 -0.0583 0.0225 0.010 
Concentration -0.0185 0.0226 0.4742 
   Lerner 0.0036 0.0130 0.1217 
   HHI 0.0023 0.0108 0.0847    
Table 5: Explaining heterogeneity in the estimates of the competition coefficient 
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Estimation methods 
  
  
   Logit -0.1874 0.0230 1.0000 -0.1599 0.0190 0.000 
OLS -0.0352 0.0244 0.7558 -0.0382 0.0184 0.038 
FE 0.0113 0.0211 0.2774 
   RE 0.0018 0.0115 0.0581 
   GMM -0.0003 0.0029 0.0402 
   TSLS -0.0001 0.0030 0.0323    
Control variables 
  
  
  regulation -0.0321 0.0197 0.7982 -0.0356 0.0138 0.010 
ownership -0.0147 0.0175 0.4811 
   global -0.0017 0.0058 0.1156    
Publication characteristics 
  
  
   citations 0.0497 0.0092 1.0000 0.0461 0.0095 0.000 
firstpub 0.0219 0.0044 1.0000 0.0233 0.0033 0.000 
IFrecursive 0.1060 0.0528 0.8749 0.0964 0.0477 0.043 
reviewed_journal -0.0249 0.0186 0.7254 -0.0151 0.0142 0.289 
Constant -0.0004 NA 1.0000 -0.1184 0.0860 0.169 
Studies 31 31 
Observations 598 598 
 
 
 
The results of our BMA exercise support the notion of the presence of publication bias (the 
regression coefficient on the standard error is similar to the one presented in Section 4); it 
seems that positive and insignificant estimates are underreported in the literature, because 
researchers tend to prefer results that are consistent with the competition-fragility hypothesis. 
Next, the larger the size of the data sample, the smaller the reported coefficient appears to be. 
As for country coverage, it seems that the estimates for developed countries tend to be slightly 
larger than those for non-OECD countries. The use of a quadratic relationship between 
competition and financial stability is associated with estimates that are on average 0.05 smaller, 
and the corresponding variable has a decisive posterior inclusion probability.  
When financial stability is proxied by dummy variables for financial distress, the resulting 
competition coefficient estimates tend to be inflated by 0.21. In contrast, the use of macro data 
does not affect the reported results in a systematic way. This finding is at odds with the literature 
survey by Beck (2008, p. 6), who notes that “while bank-level studies do not provide 
unambiguous findings on the relationship between competition and stability, cross-country 
studies point mostly to a positive relationship.” Similarly, our results contrast the finding by 
Schaeck and Cihak (2012), who argue that banks have higher capital ratios in more competitive 
environments, and thus that capitalization is one of the channels through which competition 
enhances stability. On the contrary, after controlling for many other method choices, we find 
that the use of capitalization as a proxy for stability does not affect the reported estimates of the 
effect of competition on stability. 
As for the measures of competition, the reported estimates tend to be larger by 0.11 when 
Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) H-statistic is used to measure bank competition. This systematic 
measurement issue could be due to the fact that the H-statistic imposes restrictive assumptions 
on a bank’s cost function that are only valid when the market in question is in equilibrium 
Notes: The response variable of the PCC of the β estimate from equation (1). PIP = posterior inclusion 
probability. Post. SD = posterior standard deviation. In the frequentist check we only include 
explanatory variables with PIP > 0.5. The standard errors in the frequentist check are clustered at the 
study level. More details on the BMA estimation are available in Table A1 and Figure A1. A detailed 
description of all the variables can be found in Table 4. 
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(Beck, 2008). When competition is measured by the Boone index, the estimations yield smaller 
effects on stability (by 0.05) and the explanatory power of this variable measured by the PIP is 
substantial. Concerning the suitability of market structure measures of competition, i.e., 
concentration ratios and HHI, neither of these measures was selected in our BMA exercise as 
useful in explaining the variation in the literature. To further check the robustness of this result, 
we repeat the BMA analysis in Section 6 after excluding coefficient estimates obtained from 
regressions where competition was proxied by measures of concentration and HHI. 
Regarding estimation methods, our results suggest that estimating equation (1) by a logit or a 
probit model tends to decrease the competition coefficient estimates by 0.19, while estimation 
by ordinary least squares (therefore, ignoring potential endogeneity) causes a moderate 
downward bias of about 0.04. Controlling for regulatory and supervisory measures decreases 
the estimated coefficient by approximately 0.03, which is in line with the arguments raised by 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) and Beck et al. (2006 a,b).  
All publication characteristics that we control for have relatively high posterior inclusion 
probabilities. A higher recursive impact factor and more study citations are associated with 
larger reported estimates. Conversely, peer-reviewed journals seem to publish estimates 0.02 
smaller than those reported in unpublished manuscripts, though the inclusion probability for 
this variable suggests only a weak effect. Moreover, our results indicate that the reported 
estimates of the competition coefficient increase over time.  
As a final step of our analysis, we attempt to calculate the mean estimate of the competition-
stability nexus after correcting for potential misspecifications and placing greater weight on 
estimates published in quality outlets. This part of our analysis is the most subjective as it 
requires a definition of “best practice” in estimating the competition coefficient. For each 
variable deemed useful by the BMA exercise, i.e., with PIP larger than 0.5, we plug in a 
preferred value, a sample minimum or a sample maximum, or, in the case of no preference, a 
sample mean. Then we compute a linear combination of regression parameters and obtain the 
value of the partial correlation coefficient conditional on our definition of best practice. We 
plug in the sample maxima for the size of the data set, the recursive impact factor, and the 
number of citations. We also prefer if the study is published in a peer-reviewed journal, if the 
estimation controls for regulation measures, as a higher degree of restrictions on banks’ 
activities and barriers to bank entry is linked to systemic banking distress (Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine, 2004; Beck et al., 2006 a,b), and if the researcher uses the Boone index, a relatively 
novel approach to measuring competition arising from the industrial organization literature. 
Because our focus rests primarily on the most precise competition coefficient estimates, we plug 
in the value 0 for the standard error of the PCC of the estimate (similarly as in Section 4, this 
approach corrects for publication bias). We also prefer if OLS is not used for the estimation of 
the competition-stability nexus, because it does not account for potential endogeneity. We 
prefer if a continuous variable is used as a proxy for stability, and if simple logit is not used for 
the estimation (again, because it does not allow for addressing endogeneity). We plug in zero 
for the dummy variable that corresponds to the assumed quadratic relation between 
competition and stability; in this case we have to linearize the estimates, which might induce a 
bias. We prefer if the H-statistic is not used in the estimation, because, as we have mentioned, it 21 
 
imposes restrictive assumptions on a bank’s cost function that are only valid when the market in 
question is in equilibrium (Beck, 2008). We plug in sample means for all the other variables. 
 
Best practice 
Weighted Unweighted 
Estimate 95% Conf. Int. Diff. Estimate 95% Conf. Int. Diff. 
       
All countries 0.022 -0.022 0.066 0.034 0.038 0.000 0.076 0.039 
Developed 0.096 0.049 0.144 0.085 0.091 0.045 0.137 0.071 
Developing and 
transition 
0.019 -0.035 0.072 0.038 0.055 0.011 0.099 0.054  
 
 
 
Table 6 summarizes the results of our best-practice estimation. Apart from the baseline results 
reported in the left-hand part of the table, we also report results for unweighted regressions 
(discussed in more detail in the next section) in the right-hand part. The column denoted 
“Diff.” shows the difference between the best-practice coefficient estimates and the simple 
means of the reported coefficients presented in Table 1 for all countries, developed countries, 
and developing and transition countries. In general, all the best-practice coefficient estimates are 
larger than the means reported in Table 1, which captures both the correction for publication 
bias and alleged misspecifications. Concerning the baseline results, however, only the estimate 
for developed countries is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, 
based on the guidelines for the interpretation of the size of partial correlation coefficients in 
economics (Doucouliagos, 2011), even the largest estimate reported in Table 6 represents 
merely a borderline case between no effect and a small effect. According to the classic Cohen 
(1988) guidelines, the estimate is below the threshold set for small effects. Overall, even the 
best-practice exercise does not reveal any important effect of bank competition on financial 
stability.  
 
6 Robustness Checks 
 
6.1 Alternative BMA Specifications   
In this subsection we present the results of two robustness checks, which we obtain by 
estimating the BMA exercise with some modifications. First, we report the results of BMA 
when employing alternative priors (g-prior and model size). Second, we present the results for 
unweighted regressions with the same priors for BMA as in the baseline estimation in Section 5.  
Table 6: Best-practice estimates of the competition coefficient 
Notes: The table presents estimates of the competition coefficient for selected country groups implied by 
Bayesian model averaging and our definition of best practice. We take the regression coefficients estimated 
by BMA with PIP > 0.5 and construct fitted values of the competition coefficient conditional on control for 
publication characteristics and other aspects of methodology (see the text for details). Diff. = the difference 
between these estimates and the means reported in Table 1. The confidence intervals are constructed using 
study-level clustered standard errors estimated by OLS. The right-hand part of the table presents results 
based on the robustness check using unweighted regressions (Table 8 in the next section).  
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The baseline estimation presented in the previous section employs the unit information prior 
for Zellner’s g-prior. In this setting, the prior contains the same amount of information as one 
observation in the data set, and the prior is commonly used in the literature. Moreover, the 
uniform model prior used in the baseline specification gives the same prior probability to each 
model; Eicher et al. (2011) show that their choice of priors often delivers the best predictive 
performance. Nevertheless, the uniform model prior favors models with the mean number of 
regressors, i.e., 35/2 = 17.5, because they are the most numerous among all the possible model 
combinations. Therefore, our first alternative specification uses a beta-binomial prior that places 
the same probability on each model size, in contrast to each model (Ley and Steel, 2009). We 
accompany the beta-binomial model prior with the BRIC g-prior as in Fernandez et al. (2001).  
Table 7 presents the results of our BMA exercise with alternative priors. The results are 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively very similar to those of the baseline specification. We 
observe no significant differences in the magnitude of the posterior means of individual 
variables, and the same statement holds for their posterior inclusion probabilities. The subset of 
regressors identified as useful (with PIP above 0.5) fully coincides with that of the baseline 
specification. 
  
Response variable: Bayesian model averaging Frequentist check (OLS) 
Competition effect Post. Mean Post. SD PIP Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P-value 
Data characteristics 
  
  
   SEPCC -1.7527 0.2120 1.0000 -1.1940 0.6511 0.067 
Samplesize -0.0362 0.0036 1.0000 -0.0240 0.0089 0.007 
T 
sampleyear 
0.0003 0.0034 0.0373 
   0.0000 0.0005 0.0335    
Countries examined       
   developed 0.1976 0.0248 1.0000 0.1761 0.0295 0.000 
developing and transition 0.1030 0.0188 1.0000 0.0985 0.0262 0.000 
Design of the analysis       
   quadratic -0.0517 0.0141 0.9884 -0.0441 0.0128 0.001 
endogeneity 0.0159 0.0269 0.3037 
  macro 0.0028 0.0132 0.0672 
   Averaged -0.0004 0.0043 0.0310    
Treatment of stability       
   dummies 0.2179 0.0315 1.0000 0.1841 0.0194 0.000 
NPL 0.0012 0.0047 0.0818 
   Zscore -0.0004 0.0023 0.0427 
   profit_volat 0.0004 0.0043 0.0255 
   profitability -0.0002 0.0024 0.0236 
   capitalization 0.0001 0.0024 0.0186 
   DtoD -0.0007 0.0060 0.0313    
Treatment of competition       
   Hstatistic 0.1074 0.0228 1.0000 0.1140 0.0181 0.000 
Boone -0.0637 0.0375 0.8020 -0.0583 0.0225 0.010 
Concentration -0.0182 0.0244 0.4183 
   Lerner 0.0032 0.0128 0.0946 
   HHI 0.0021 0.0107 0.0659    
Estimation methods       
   Logit -0.1883 0.0237 1.0000 -0.1599 0.0190 0.000 
Table 7: Results with alternative BMA priors 
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OLS -0.0296 0.0265 0.6208 -0.0382 0.0184 0.038 
FE 0.0160 0.0258 0.3261 
   RE 0.0020 0.0119 0.0521 
   GMM -0.0002 0.0023 0.0272 
   TSLS -0.0002 0.0031 0.0258    
Control variables       
   regulation -0.0313 0.0205 0.7625 -0.0356 0.0138 0.010 
ownership -0.0129 0.0176 0.4014 
   global -0.0013 0.0051 0.0837    
Publication characteristics       
   citations 0.0476 0.0101 1.0000 0.0461 0.0095 0.000 
firstpub 0.0207 0.0050 1.0000 0.0233 0.0033 0.000 
IFrecursive 0.0958 0.0622 0.7699 0.0964 0.0477 0.043 
reviewed_journal -0.0211 0.0198 0.6028 -0.0151 0.0142 0.289 
Constant -0.0004   NA 1.0000 -0.1184 0.0860 0.169 
Studies 31 31 
Observations 598 598     
Second, we run the BMA exercise with the same priors as in our baseline specification but for 
regressions not weighted by the inverse of the number of observations reported in studies. In 
this case studies with fewer reported competition coefficient estimates become less influential in 
the meta-analysis, and the results are dominated by papers that produce many estimates. In this 
robustness check the BMA only selects 14 variables with inclusion probability higher than 0.5 as 
opposed to 15 variables in the baseline specification. In addition, the results of the robustness 
check suggest that measuring stability by means of bank profitability tends to lower the 
coefficient estimate by 0.03. In contrast, estimating equation (1) by fixed effects or instrumental 
variables increases the estimated competition coefficient by 0.05, with a decisive PIP in both 
cases. These findings are consistent with our results from the previous section, where we report 
that using OLS (which disregards endogeneity) is associated with smaller reported estimates. 
Furthermore, including controls for bank ownership decreases the reported estimate by 0.06 
with a decisive PIP. This finding supports the results by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), who 
argue that bank ownership matters for bank stability. In particular, they find that foreign bank 
entry tends to be positively related to banking system stability, while government ownership 
impacts competitiveness as well as stability in a negative way. In contrast to the baseline 
specification, here we do not find the following aspects important: controlling for a nonlinear 
relationship between competition and stability, measuring competition via the Boone index, 
estimating equation (1) by means of OLS, controlling for regulation and supervision in the 
banking sector, and publication of the study in a peer-reviewed journal. As for the signs and 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for individual regressors, they broadly coincide with the 
baseline specification. Nevertheless, the robustness check shows less evidence for publication 
bias in the literature. Also, the estimated coefficients for dummy variables reflecting developed 
Notes: The response variable is the competition effect. PIP = posterior inclusion probability. SD = 
standard deviation. In the frequentist check we only include explanatory variables with PIP > 0.5. The 
standard errors in the frequentist check are clustered at the study level. In this specification we use the 
beta-binomial prior advocated by Ley & Steel (2009) (the prior model probabilities are the same for all 
model sizes) and the BRIC g-prior following Fernandez et al. (2001). More details on the BMA estimation 
are available in Table A2 in Appendix A. A detailed description of all the variables is available in Table 4. 
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and developing countries are much smaller, shrinking the difference between the implied 
competition coefficients for the different country groups.  
 
Response variable: Bayesian model averaging Frequentist check (OLS) 
Competition effect Post. Mean Post. SD PIP Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P-value 
Data characteristics 
  
  
   SEPCC -0.7259 0.5667 0.7003 -0.5768 0.7862 0.4630 
Samplesize -0.0258 0.0082 1.0000 -0.0248 0.0092 0.0070 
T 0.0008 0.0034 0.0735 
   sampleyear 0.0006 0.0015 0.1946 
   Countries examined             
developed 0.1529 0.0172 1.0000 0.1519 0.0175 0.0000 
developing and transition 0.1127 0.0172 1.0000 0.1156 0.0170 0.0000 
Design of the analysis             
quadratic 0.0012 0.0050 0.0755 
   endogeneity 0.0056 0.0110 0.2461 
   macro -0.0103 0.0161 0.3408 
   Averaged 0.0000 0.0024 0.0219 
   Treatment of stability             
dummies 0.1861 0.0281 1.0000 0.1660 0.0176 0.0000 
NPL 0.0138 0.0249 0.2739 
   Zscore 0.0091 0.0166 0.2660 
  profit_volat 0.0176 0.0238 0.4350 
   profitability -0.0281 0.0233 0.6587 -0.0451 0.0246 0.0660 
capitalization 0.0101 0.0196 0.2437 
   DtoD -0.0015 0.0080 0.0674 
   Treatment of competition             
Hstatistic 0.1294 0.0223 1.0000 0.1123 0.0173 0.0000 
Boone -0.0021 0.0088 0.0873 
   Concentration 0.0159 0.0244 0.3626 
  Lerner 0.0136 0.0211 0.3566 
   HHI 0.0103 0.0199 0.2488 
   Estimation methods             
Logit -0.1304 0.0303 0.9999 -0.1275 0.0121 0.0000 
OLS 0.0000 0.0019 0.0214 
   FE 0.0621 0.0134 1.0000 0.0503 0.0113 0.0000 
RE 0.0128 0.0204 0.3355 
  GMM 0.0000 0.0018 0.0221 
   TSLS 0.0532 0.0132 0.9999 0.0515 0.0147 0.0000 
Control variables             
regulation 0.0002 0.0020 0.0281 
   ownership -0.0595 0.0096 1.0000 -0.0588 0.0289 0.0420 
global 0.0016 0.0054 0.1033 
   Publication characteristics             
citations 0.0377 0.0063 0.9996 0.0407 0.0087 0.0000 
firstpub 0.0179 0.0033 0.9997 0.0205 0.0029 0.0000 
IFrecursive 0.0470 0.0419 0.6405 0.0490 0.0379 0.1960 
reviewed_journal 0.0019 0.0080 0.0807 
   Constant -0.1269   NA 1.0000 -0.1263 0.0870 0.1460 
Studies 31 31 
Observations 598 598  
 
Notes: The response variable is the competition effect. PIP = posterior inclusion probability. SD = 
standard deviation. In the frequentist check we only include explanatory variables with PIP > 0.5. The 
standard errors in the frequentist check are clustered at the study level. In this specification we do not 
weight the regressions by the inverse of the number of estimates reported per study. More details on 
the BMA estimation are available in Table A3 in Appendix A. A detailed description of all the 
variables is available in Table 4.  
Table 8: Results for unweighted regressions 
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6.2 Excluding Estimates Computed Using Concentration Measures 
 
In this subsection we evaluate the robustness of our results using a more homogeneous data set. 
We exclude the estimates in which market structure measures, such as concentration ratios and 
HHI, are used as proxies for competitiveness in the banking sector. There are several reasons 
why the estimates constructed using concentration measures might not be fully comparable to 
the rest of the literature. For example, Claessens and Laeven (2004) conclude that 
concentration is an unsuitable proxy for competition and that the two measures, concentration 
and competition, highlight different banking sector characteristics. Furthermore, Beck (2008, 
p. 17), in his literature survey, argues that “market structure measures such as concentration 
ratios are inadequate measures of bank competition. Higher concentration might result in more 
stability through channels other than lack of competitiveness, such as improved risk 
diversification.” Therefore, a higher degree of market concentration does not necessarily imply 
less competition.  
After excluding the concentration-stability estimates from our sample, we are left with 345 
reported coefficient estimates from regressions where competition is measured by either the 
Lerner index, the H-statistic or the Boone index. This robustness check is extensive and has the 
same structure as the baseline analysis presented in the previous sections; it summarizes the new 
data set, tests for publication bias, and attempts to quantify the “best-practice” estimate of the 
competition-stability nexus. We show that the conclusions from this robustness check are 
similar to our main results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Time evolution of estimates Figure 7: Distribution of estimates  
Notes: The figure shows the histogram of the 
PCCs of the pure competition coefficient estimates 
(the PCCs of the β estimates from equation (1)) 
reported in individual studies. The solid vertical 
line denotes the mean of all the PCCs. The 
dashed lines denote the mean of the study-level 
medians and the mean of the PCCs of the 
estimates reported in studies published in peer-
reviewed journals. 
Notes: The figure depicts the median PCCs of the 
pure competition coefficient estimates (the PCCs 
of the β estimates from equation (1)) reported in 
individual studies. The horizontal axis measures 
the year when the first drafts of studies appeared in 
Google Scholar. The line shows the linear fit. 
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Figure 6 plots the medians of the “pure” (that is, homogeneous) competition-stability coefficient 
estimates against the first year of publication of the study from which they are collected. Once 
again we observe an increasing spread among the reported coefficient estimates over time. The 
slight upward trend in the reported estimates for the entire sample is now replaced by a 
similarly slight downward tendency. 
Figure 7 displays the histogram of the PCCs of the competition estimates. The solid line depicts 
the mean PCC value over all studies, which equals 0.0011, while the black dashed line denotes 
the mean of the study-level medians (0.0104). Additionally, the red dashed line shows the mean 
PCC of the estimates published in journals (0.0016). In sum, these statistics are statistically 
insignificant in all cases, consistent with the results reported earlier for the whole sample, and 
imply very little impact of bank competition on financial stability. 
Figure 8 depicts the partial correlation coefficients of the pure competition coefficient estimates 
from equation (1) as reported in individual studies. After omitting the concentration-stability 
coefficient estimates from the sample, the number of individual studies decreases from 31 in 
the original sample to 23. The more homogeneous sample shows similar values of within- and 
between-study heterogeneity in the reported results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the structure of the main analysis, Table 9 presents the simple means of the PCCs of 
the pure competition coefficient estimates for all countries as well as for developed and 
developing economies. The means of the estimates weighted by the inverse of the number of 
Figure 8: Estimates of the competition coefficient in individual studies 
Notes: The figure shows a box plot of the PCCs of the competition 
coefficient estimates reported in individual studies when the concentration-
stability estimates are omitted. Full references for the studies included in 
the meta-analysis are available in Appendix B. 
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estimates reported per study are negative for all country groups, though they are again close to 0 
and not significant at the 5% level (and not economically significant according to the guidelines 
by Doucouliagos, 2011). The unweighted means are, on the other hand, positive, but also close 
to 0 and insignificant. Both the weighted and unweighted means appear to be slightly larger for 
developed countries, as was the case in the baseline analysis as well. 
 
 
 
Unweighted Weighted No. of 
estimates 
 
Mean 95% Conf. Interval Mean 95% Conf. Interval 
All 0.001 -0.019 0.021 -0.016 -0.041 0.009 345 
Developed 0.011 -0.009 0.030 -0.008 -0.049 0.033 109 
Developing 
and transition 0.004 -0.036 0.044 -0.024 -0.061 0.012 83 
 
 
 
 
Following the main analysis in Section 4, we test for the presence of publication bias in the 
literature. Figure 9 presents funnel plots for all the estimates and for the median estimates per 
study. It appears that the funnels are quite symmetrical and that positive and negative estimates, 
as well as significant and insignificant estimates, are reported in the literature. Overall, visual 
examination of the data does not point to strong publication bias. 
 
 
 
 
A: All estimates B: Median estimates per study 
Table 9: Simple means of the PCCs of the pure competition coefficient estimates  
Notes: The table presents the mean PCCs of the competition coefficient estimates (the 
PCCs of the β estimates from equation (1)) over all countries and for selected country 
groups. The confidence intervals around the mean are constructed using standard errors 
clustered at the study level. In the right-hand part of the table the estimates are weighted 
by the inverse of the number of pure competition estimates reported per study. 
Notes: In the absence of publication bias the funnel should be symmetrical around the most precise PCC 
of the estimates of the competition coefficient (the PCCs of the β estimates from equation (1)). The dashed 
vertical lines denote the mean of the PCCs of all the estimates in Figure 9A and the mean of the median 
PCCs of the estimates reported in the studies in Figure 9B.  
Figure 9: Funnel plots do not suggest substantial publication bias 
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Next, we turn to a more formal test for the presence of publication bias: the funnel asymmetry 
test. We follow the steps explained in detail in Section 4 and investigate if there is a correlation 
between the pure competition coefficient estimates (that is, after excluding the concentration-
stability estimates) and their standard errors. Table 10 reports the results. The estimates 
obtained in all the regressions are very similar to those for the whole sample in Table 2. The 
estimates of the underlying effect beyond the bias are all significant at least at the 5% level, but 
again close to zero. According to Doucouliagos’ (2011) guidelines, these estimates point to no 
interplay between competition and stability. In a similar vein, the new regressions yield 
comparable estimates of publication bias to those of the whole sample. In contrast to the main 
analysis, however, the magnitude of the publication bias for estimates reported in published 
studies does not appear to be higher than that for unpublished manuscripts. Moreover, the 
underlying effect beyond publication bias also does not seem to differ between published and 
unpublished studies.  
 
 
Unweighted regressions FE FE_Published Instr  Instr_Published 
SE (publication bias) -1.855** -1.881** -2.059*** -2.237*** 
Constant (effect beyond bias) 0.048** 0.054** 0.053*** 0.064*** 
No. of estimates 345 272 345 272 
No. of studies 23 17 23 17 
Weighted regressions FE FE_Published 
SE (publication bias) -1.683*** -1.697*** 
Constant (effect beyond bias) 0.032*** 0.026*** 
No. of estimates                 345                     272 
No. of studies                  23                      17 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the heteroskedasticity-corrected funnel asymmetry tests. By 
weighting the equations by precision, the estimation now places more weight on more precise 
pure competition coefficient estimates. In contrast to the main analysis in Table 3, the evidence 
for publication bias now appears to be widespread across different estimation techniques and 
specifications. The estimates of the magnitude of publication bias are also larger in absolute 
terms and statistically significant at least at the 10% level. In line with the main analysis, the 
estimates of the true effect are similar to those presented in the previous table, and are close to 
zero. According to the guidelines of Doucouliagos and Stanley (2013) for interpreting the 
funnel asymmetry test, our results point to substantial publication bias when we exclude all 
concentration-stability estimates.  
 
Table 10: Funnel asymmetry tests suggest the presence of publication bias 
Notes: The table presents the results of equation (6). The standard errors of the regression 
parameters are clustered at the study level. Published = we only include published studies. Fixed 
Effects = we use study dummies. Instrument = we use the logarithm of the number of 
observations in equation (1) as an instrument for the standard error and employ study fixed 
effects. The regressions in the bottom half of the table are estimated by weighted least squares, 
where the inverse of the number of estimates reported per study is taken as the weight. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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 Unweighted regressions FE FE_Published Instr  Instr_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond bias) 0.024 0.064* 0.039** 0.050** 
Constant (publication bias) -2.210* -4.651* -3.285*** -3.744*** 
No. of estimates 345 272 345 272 
No. of studies 23 17 23 17 
Weighted regressions FE FE_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond bias) 0.021 0.062** 
Constant (publication bias) -2.207* -5.369** 
No. of estimates 345 272 
No. of studies 23 17 
 
 
 
 
Finally, following the baseline analysis, we apply the “best-practice” estimation described at the 
end of Section 5 to the subsample containing only pure competition coefficient estimates. Due 
to insufficient convergence of the MCMC algorithm to the underlying analytical distribution in 
the BMA exercise for the reduced data set, a new set of variables influencing the pure 
competition coefficient cannot be determined. For this reason, we use the same definition of 
best practice and plug in the sample means and sample maxima for the same variables as 
discussed in Section 5, but using OLS estimates for the more homogeneous data set. The 
resulting coefficients are presented in Table 12. For both weighted and unweighted equations, 
the estimated competition coefficient for developed countries is again larger than that for 
developing and transition countries. Nevertheless, none of the estimates in Table 12 is 
significant at the 5% level. Overall, we conclude that, after collecting all estimates from the 
literature and applying various meta-analysis methods, there appears to be no apparent 
relationship between bank competition and financial stability. 
 
 
Best practice 
Weighted Unweighted 
Estimate 95% Conf. Int. Diff. Estimate 95% Conf. Int. Diff. 
All 0.014 -0.046 0.075 0.030 -0.033 -0.067 0.001 -0.034 
Developed 0.033 -0.037 0.102 0.041 0.017 -0.030 0.064 0.006 
Developing 
and transition 
0.001 -0.073 0.074 0.025 0.001 -0.059 0.062 -0.003 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Heteroskedasticity-corrected funnel asymmetry tests  
Table 12: Best-practice estimates of the pure competition coefficient 
Notes: The table presents the results of the regression specified in equation (7). The standard 
errors of the regression parameters are clustered at the study level. Published = we only include 
published studies. Fixed Effects = we use study dummies. Instrument = we use the logarithm of the 
number of observations in equation (1) as an instrument for the standard error and employ study 
fixed effects. The regressions in the bottom half of the table are estimated by weighted least 
squares, where the inverse of the number of estimates reported per study is taken as the weight. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Notes: The table presents estimates of the competition coefficient for selected country groups implied 
by the analysis of heterogeneity and our definition of best practice. We take the regression coefficients 
from the regression and construct fitted values of the competition coefficient conditional on control for 
publication characteristics and other aspects of methodology (see the main text for details). Diff. = the 
difference between these estimates and the means reported in Table 9. The confidence intervals are 
constructed using study-level clustered standard errors estimated by OLS. The right-hand part of the 
table presents results based on the robustness check using unweighted regressions (Table 8).  30 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
 
We conduct a meta-regression analysis of 598 estimates of the relationship between bank 
competition and financial stability reported in 31 studies. We complement the previous 
narrative reviews of the literature (Beck, 2008; Carletti and Hartmann, 2002) with a formal 
treatment of publication bias and heterogeneity in estimations of the competition-stability nexus. 
Our results suggest that the mean reported estimate of the relationship is close to zero, even 
after correcting for publication bias and potential misspecification problems. We find evidence 
for publication selection against positive results; that is, some authors of primary studies tend to 
discard estimates inconsistent with the competition-fragility hypothesis. To uncover the 
dependence of the reported estimates on the aspects of study design, we employ Bayesian 
model averaging, which helps us address model uncertainty. 
Our results indicate that data characteristics matter for the reported coefficients corresponding 
to the competition-stability nexus. Researchers who use heterogeneous samples of countries 
(including both developed and developing economies) tend to obtain smaller estimates. The 
effect of competition on stability is larger in developed countries, but even there the positive 
effects do not seem to be strong. Next, accounting for potential nonlinearities in the effect of 
competition on stability is important and typically yields smaller estimates of the competition-
stability nexus. We also find that, in general, researchers who have more data at their disposal 
tend to report smaller estimates. 
Furthermore, we show that the definition of the proxy for financial stability is important for the 
results of primary studies. For example, if dummy variables (usually indicating financial crises) 
are used as a proxy for stability, the authors tend to report much larger estimates than when a 
continuous measure of financial stability is used. In a similar vein, the results of primary studies 
are systematically affected by the choice of the proxy for bank competition. Studies using the H-
statistic tend to report larger estimates of the competition-stability nexus, while studies that 
employ the Boone index usually show smaller estimates. Next, if the researchers ignore the 
endogeneity problem in regressing financial stability on bank competition, they tend to 
underestimate the effect.  
We also find that controlling for supervisory and regulatory conditions in regressions usually 
decreases the reported estimates, which supports the notion that banking systems with more 
activity restrictions and greater barriers to entry are more likely to suffer from systemic financial 
distress (Beck et al., 2006 a,b). Finally, studies that receive more citations and are published in 
journals with a high impact factor tend to report larger estimates of the competition-stability 
nexus. In the last step of our analysis we construct a weighted average of all the estimates and 
give more weight to the ones whose authors avoid potential misspecifications (such as ignoring 
endogeneity) and that have better publication characteristics (for example, more citations). 
Because several potential misspecifications influence the results in opposite ways, the resulting 
estimate still points to a very weak or non-existent link between bank competition and financial 
stability. 
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The principal limitation of meta-analysis is that it can only correct for problems in the literature 
that have already been addressed by some researchers. If, in contrast, all studies in the field 
share a common misspecification that causes a systematic bias, meta-analysis gives biased results 
as well. It is possible that the underlying effect of banking competition on financial stability is 
nonzero, but that the data and methods that are currently used in the literature do not allow 
researchers to identify such an effect. Nevertheless, we show that the bulk of the existing 
empirical literature provides little support for either the competition-fragility or competition-
stability hypothesis. 
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 Appendix A: BMA Diagnostics 
  
Mean no. regressors Draws Burnins Time No. models visited 
16.7873 
Modelspace 2^K 
2.00E+06 
% visited 
1.00E+06 
% Topmodels 
8.946665 mins 
Corr PMP 
428100 
No. Obs. 
3.4e+10 0.0012 85 
g-Prior 
0.9991 598 
Model Prior Shrinkage-Stats 
uniform / 17.5 UIP Av=0.9983      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean no. regressors Draws Burnins Time No. models visited 
15.9075 2.00E+06 1.00E+06 9.343995 mins 340418 
Modelspace 2^K % visited % Topmodels Corr PMP No. Obs. 
3.4e+10 0.00099 92 0.9991 598 
Model Prior g-Prior Shrinkage-Stats 
random / 17.5 BRIC Av=0.9992 
 
 
Table A1: Summary of BMA estimation, baseline estimation 
Figure A1: Model size and convergence, baseline estimation 
Notes: In this specification we employ the priors suggested by Eicher et al. (2011) based on predictive 
performance: the uniform model prior (each model has the same prior probability) and the unit information 
prior (the prior provides the same amount of information as one observation of data). 
Notes: The “random“ model prior refers to the beta-binomial prior used by Ley & Steel (2009): the prior 
model probabilities are the same for all possible model sizes. In this specification we set Zellner’s g prior in 
line with Fernandez et al. (2001). 
Table A2: Summary of BMA estimation, alternative priors 
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Mean no. regressors Draws Burnins Time No. models visited 
17.3680 2.00E+06 1.00E+06 9.077281 mins 543559 
Modelspace 2^K % visited % Topmodels Corr PMP No. Obs. 
3.4e+10 0.0016 69 0.9961 598 
Model Prior g-Prior Shrinkage-Stats 
uniform / 17.5 UIP Av=0.9983 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Summary of BMA estimation, unweighted regressions 
Notes: In this specification we employ the priors suggested by Eicher et al. (2011) based on predictive 
performance: the uniform model prior (each model has the same prior probability) and the unit 
information prior (the prior provides the same amount of information as one observation of data). 
Figure A3: Model size and convergence, unweighted regressions 
Figure A2: Model size and convergence, alternative priors 
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